72,761 research outputs found

    Equilibrium states of the pressure function for products of matrices

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    Let {Mi}i=1\{M_i\}_{i=1}^\ell be a non-trivial family of d×dd\times d complex matrices, in the sense that for any nNn\in \N, there exists i1...in{1,...,}ni_1... i_n\in \{1,..., \ell\}^n such that Mi1...Min0M_{i_1}... M_{i_n}\neq {\bf 0}. Let P ⁣:(0,)RP \colon (0,\infty)\to \R be the pressure function of {Mi}i=1\{M_i\}_{i=1}^\ell. We show that for each q>0q>0, there are at most dd ergodic qq-equilibrium states of PP, and each of them satisfies certain Gibbs property.Comment: 12 pages. To appear in DCD

    Omnidirectionally Bending to the Normal in epsilon-near-Zero Metamaterials

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    Contrary to conventional wisdom that light bends away from the normal at the interface when it passes from high to low refractive index media, here we demonstrate an exotic phenomenon that the direction of electromagnetic power bends towards the normal when light is incident from arbitrary high refractive index medium to \epsilon-near-zero metamaterial. Moreover, the direction of the transmitted beam is close to the normal for all angles of incidence. In other words, the electromagnetic power coming from different directions in air or arbitrary high refractive index medium can be redirected to the direction almost parallel to the normal upon entering the \epsilon-near-zero metamaterial. This phenomenon is counterintuitive to the behavior described by conventional Snell's law and resulted from the interplay between \epsilon-near-zero and material loss. This property has potential applications in communications to increase acceptance angle and energy delivery without using optical lenses and mechanical gimbals

    Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility

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    The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with non-linear utility (cf. Alaei et al., 2012). Nonetheless, for linear utility agents satisfying a natural regularity property, Alaei et al. (2018) showed that simply posting an anonymous price is an e-approximation. We give a parameterization of the regularity property that extends to agents with non-linear utility and show that the approximation bound of anonymous pricing for regular agents approximately extends to agents that satisfy this approximate regularity property. We apply this approximation framework to prove that anonymous pricing is a constant approximation to the revenue optimal single-item auction for agents with public-budget utility, private-budget utility, and (a special case of) risk-averse utility.Comment: Appeared at EC 201
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